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I.

INTRODUCTION

Few legal restrictions inhibit foreign investment in the United
States. In fact, American assets have recently been an attractive investment. Japanese investment in United States real estate in 1989
was $14.8 billion, and it was not less than $7 billion in any year
from 1985 to 1990.1 Of total Japanese investment, hotels and resorts
accounted for approximately 36 % in 1989, with office buildings representing 13 %.2 By the end of 1988, foreign investors held 16.4% of
all United States Treasury securities.3
American businesses have also been appealing targets for foreign
investment. From 1988 to 1991, more than five hundred foreign
takeovers and investments in United States firms were reported to
the Committee on Foreign Investment.4 Among these reported acquisitions were takeovers of businesses in aerospace, chemicals, computers, electronics, semiconductors, and telecommunications by
companies from Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and Australia.'
In the very recent past, foreign investment has become a source of
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increased political controversy. Opinion polls suggest that approximately 70 % of Americans think that Japan has invested too much in
the United States.' Accordingly, in August, 1991, there were reportedly twenty-four bills to limit foreign investment pending in
Congress.
Although efforts to limit the amount or aim of foreign investment
in the United States may be increasingly common, they have generally been unsuccessful. In 1988, Congress did approve a provision to
require foreign investors who were buying specified amounts of real
estate and business interests to register with the federal government.8
However, proposals to limit the amount of direct foreign investment
in the United States, impose higher capital gains taxes on foreign
investors, or curtail acquisitions of American firms on national security grounds have been frustrated.9 Federal Reserve Board Chairman
Alan Greenspan has described foreign investment as a "plus." 10 The
Reagan and Bush Administrations have "smiled on foreign investment" 11 and are thought likely to veto anti-free trade legislation. 2
Thus, the restrictions on foreign investment in the United States,
to the extent they exist, appear to be economic ones. One economic
factor is of particular recent concern: the cost of complying with
American environmental laws and responding to American environmental litigation. This article attempts an introduction, in some detail, to the primary environmental rules and laws of special interest
to potential foreign investors in the United States.
II.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS

For many years, American environmental law was almost exclusively a creature of the common law as developed in each of the
several states. In the past twenty years, however, the federal and
state governments have also passed a series of statutes designed to
protect and to clean up the nation's air, water, and land.
Following is a discussion of the major federal environmental laws
of general applicability to investors and businesses in the United
6. Fear of Foreigners,ECONOMIST, Aug. 10, 1991, at 15.
7. Id.
8. The Exon-Florio Amendment to the Defense Production Act, 50 U.S.C. §
2170(c) (1988), set up the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States to
review foreign investments that might impair "national security." Since its creation, the
committee has blocked only one of the transactions reviewed, an acquisition of a United
States airplane parts manufacturer by an arm of the Chinese government. Correll &
Nash, Lifelines Abroad, A.F. MAG., Oct. 1991, at 42. That transaction had been attempted shortly after the 1989 massacre in Tiananmen Square. Id.
9.
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Id.

[VOL 28: 897, 1991]

United States Envtl. -Legal Regime
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

States. Reasons are given for their significance. The primary com-

mon law bases for liability are first introduced."3 The article then

explains the two major federal statutes governing discharges of pollutants into air and water.' 4 Next, the two major federal statutes
governing hazardous waste are discussed,1 5 with emphasis on the

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,16 the law with the greatest and most surprising im-

pact on business transactions.17 Finally, this section addresses certain

specific environmental problems relevant to acquisition of property

or a business or operation of a business.1 '
However, this exposition is intended to be no more than an introduction. The importance that American environmental law plays in a
decision to invest in the United States obviously depends on a num-

ber of factors, all of which cannot possibly be addressed in this format. Certain environmental laws and restrictions directed toward

specific problems or industries are not examined.' 9 An investment in
industries affected by these laws may require much more extensive

and specific study. Moreover, because the federal government has
generally tried to avoid preempting state statutes more restrictive

than their federal counterparts, ° the potential investor must be
aware that any state may have environmental laws and restrictions

13. See infra text accompanying notes 22-45.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 46-77.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 78-256.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 96-256.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 257-90.
19. For example, chemical manufacturers are subject to the requirements of the
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-29 (1988). Those who manufacture
pesticides must comply with the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7
U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988). The dumping of materials at sea is regulated by the Marine
Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-45 (1988). The nuclear
power industry must comply with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014,
2021-21a, 2022, 2111-14 (1988), and the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2021b-21d (1988). Certain mining activities are restricted by the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-11, 1231-1328 (1988).
20. A state law is expressly preempted when a federal statute or regulation explicitly provides that federal control will be exclusive. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. NELSON
YOUNG. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 292-94 (2d ed. 1983). Even when federal law does not
expressly preempt state legislation, implied preemption may be found in any of three
alternative circumstances: (1) when the'federal regulatory scheme is so pervasive that
Congress has left no room for the states to supplement the federal scheme; (2) when the
state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of Congress' purposes and objectives of federal law; or (3) when compliance with both federal and state
law is impossible. California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 581
(1987); Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368 (1986).
A state law may be saved from preemption by a saving proviso contained in a federal

which
are more restrictive than the federal statutes addressed below. 21 Accordingly, no promise is made here to identify or explain
each of the numerous twists, turns, and traps a foreign investor may
encounter when confronting United States environmental law.
A.

Common Law Enforcement of Environmental Interests

State common law is the original tool of environmental law enforcement. The traditional causes of action, discussed below, include
nuisance, trespass, negligence, and strict liability. The remedies provided by the common law include injunctive and monetary relief.
The possibility of punitive damages, amounts awarded in excess of
actual damages, also exists in cases of wanton behavior. Although
common law develops in the individual state court systems, most
common law torts vary little from state to state.
Nuisance is a primary common law cause of action for en\vironmental torts. Nuisance is defined as "tortious conduct which
produces unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of
another's land."22 Nuisances are either private or public. A private
nuisance disturbs the property rights of particular persons.2 3 A public nuisance is an interference with the property rights of the community at large.2 4 Private parties are generally prevented from suing
on a public nuisance.2 5 The common law of nuisance has provided a
basis for actions to abate or recover damages for odors emanating
from industrial facilities, 26 contamination of neighboring groundwater, 27 and the pollution of neighboring landowners' soil.2 8 It is no
defense that the nuisance was carried on in accordance with a permit
statute. For example, CERCLA explicitly allows states to impose additional liability requirements with respect to the release of hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a)
(1988).
21. For a more thorough discussion of state environmental laws, see D. SELMI & K.
MANASTER, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1991).
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979).

23. To recover damages for a private nuisance, a plaintiff must show that the defendant intended to interfere with plaintiff's use and enjoyment of land, that some substantial interference has occurred of the kind intended, and that the interference was
unreasonable. W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 87 (5th ed.
1984).
24. Id. § 90. A public nuisance is an act or omission "which obstructs or causes
inconvenience or damage to the public in the exercise of rights common to all." Id.
(quoting J. STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 105
(1890)). A public nuisance might be a hog pen, the storage of explosives, gambling
houses, or unlicensed prize fights. Id. § 90, n.19.
25. See generally id. § 86. A private party is generally not permitted to bring
actions to abate a public nuisance unless it causes or threatens special damage to him or
her apart from that to the general public. Then the private party can bring suit only to
the extent necessary to protect his or her own interests. Id. §§ 89, 90.
26. See, e.g., Ozark Poultry Prod. v. Garman, 251 Ark. 389, 472 S.W.2d 714
(1971).
27. See, e.g., Branch v. Western Petroleum Corp., 657 P.2d 267, 270 (Utah 1982).
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because a permit does not confer a license to harm the property of
another.2"
A second common law cause of action, trespass, is closely related
to nuisance. Rather than the interference with the use and enjoy-

ment of land that marks nuisance, trespass is an invasion of the ex-

clusive possession of another's land.3 0 However, trespass requires a

showing neither of damage to the land nor of intent."' Generally if32a
trespass claim is successful, liability is found in nuisance as well.
A third liability theory, negligence, is the breach of a legal duty
owed to another which causes damages to the non-breaching party.33
The legal duty may be conclusively mandated by a statute or rule

defining a code of conduct. 34 The duty may vary according to the
defendant's knowledge of the activity's inherent danger. 35 Accord-

ingly, persons failing to exercise reasonable care in the handling or
disposal of hazardous substances, or failing to meet the requirements

imposed by laws governing them, may be liable to injured plaintiffs
in negligence.
The common law negligence doctrine recognizes a duty to warn of
danger. 36 If a defendant knows about a hazardous product or condi-

tion and has no reason to believe that those who will come into contact with that product or condition will know of that danger, he or
28. See, e.g., Wilsonville v. S.C.A. Servs., 86 I11.2d 1, 426 N.E.2d 824 (1981).
29. W. KEETON, supra note 23, § 88B.
30. W. KEETON, supra note 23, § 87. "The difference is that between walking
across his lawn and establishing a bawdy house next door; between felling a tree across
his boundary line and keeping him awake at night with the noise of a rolling mill." Id.
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965).
32. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D.
Pa. 1982) (applying Pennsylvania law); Martin v. Reynolds Metal Co., 221 Or. 86, 342
P.2d 790 (1959).
33. W. KEETON, supra note 23, § 30; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281
(1965). Liability may be imposed even though the harm was not intentional. To establish
breach of a duty owed, the plaintiff must demonstrate only that the defendant failed to
meet the standard of care of a "reasonable person." W. KEETON, supra note 23, § 32.
34. If the statute or rule is designed to protect a class of persons of which the
plaintiff is part, and the harm that has occurred is the type meant to be prevented, a
majority of courts hold that breach of duty owed is conclusively established under the
doctrine of "negligence per se." W. KEETON, supra note 23, § 36.
35. Reynolds Metal Co. v. Yturbide, 258 F.2d 321 (9th Cir.), cert. denied., 358
U.S. 840 (1958).
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965). The Restatement provides
generally that a supplier of a product to be used by a third party may be liable if the
supplier:
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous
for the use for which it is supplied, and (b) has no reason to believe that those
for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition

she must exercise reasonable care to warn them of such danger.37
Thus, unreasonable failure to warn can result in negligence liability.
A fourth common law cause of action which applies to environmental torts is strict liability. It is imposed on a defendant without
regard to the defendant's fault.38 There are narrowly construed areas
of activity to which strict liability applies. Strict liability may be imposed when "abnormally dangerous conduct"39 results in injury to
others.40
Among the activities affecting the environment which have been
held to give rise to strict liability are the contamination of groundwater from an underground tank,4 leaking of toxic materials from a
railway car,42 and flooding of neighborhood lands by water from a
mining operation. 43 Earlier cases imposed strict liability for damages
from the storage of inflammable liquids, the accumulation of sewage,
44
and the emission of creosote fumes.
It is important to note that under common law theories, punitive
damages may be available in addition to actual or compensatory
damages. Large sums may be awarded to tort plaintiffs if a court or
jury finds that the defendant's wrongful conduct was willful, grossly
negligent, wanton, or otherwise abhorrent. 4 ' The prospect of sustaining a large punitive damages award gives those whose activities
may affect the environment a great incentive for carefulness.
B. Clean Air Act
The Clean Air Act,46 which governs the discharge of polltitants
into the air, was one of the first major pieces of environmental legislation passed in the United States. The Act provides comprehensive
or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
Id. See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1062 (1984) (adequacy of written warning of danger of paraquat); Dougherty v. Hooker
Chem. Corp., 540 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1976) (adequacy of warning about danger of metal
cleaner is measured by danger of product, foreseeability or harm, and burden of
warning).
37. Dougherty v. Hooker Chem. Corp., 540 F.2d 174, 176-78 (3d Cir. 1976).
38. Strict liability is imposed on a party apart from either an intent to interfere
with a legally prQtected interest without legal justification or a breach of duty to exercise
reasonable care. W. KEETON, supra note 23, § 75.
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1976).
40. Id. See Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc. 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982).
41. Yommer v. McKenzie, 225 Md. 220, 257 A.2d 138 (1969).
42. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co., 517 F. Supp. 314 (N.D.
Ill.
1981).
43. Mowrer v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 518 F.2d 659 (7th Cir. 1975).
44. See W. KEETON, supra note 23, § 78.
45. E.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tenn. 1986)
($7.5 million in punitive damages awarded for hazardous waste disposal); Miller v.
Cudahy Co., 592 F. Supp. 976 (D. Kan. 1984) (awarding $10 million in punitive damages for pollution of groundwater).
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988).
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federal regulation of both stationary " and moving 48 sources of air

pollution.49 Both the Act and regulations promulgated under it are

extremely complex.5" Generally, however, investors should be aware

that a business facility's air emissions may be restricted, as outlined

below, to meet applicable air pollution standards.
The Act imposes three sets of air quality standards. First, the Act
prescribes National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for
primary 5 and secondary 52 pollutants. 53 Special location-specific restrictions apply in areas where NAAQS are being attained for the
prevention of significant air quality deterioration (PSD). In areas
where NAAQS are not being attained, called "nonattainment areas," 55 major new sources or modifications to existing sources must
meet strict controls based on "the lowest achievable emission
rate[s]. '
Second, the Act prescribes New Source Performance
Standards (NSPS). These NSPS are issued industry by industry,
based on application of the "best system of continuous emissions
reduction.

' 57

Third, the Act sets standards for hazardous air pollu-

tants, which are most strictly regulated.58

47. A stationary source is "any building, structure, facility or installation which
emits or may emit any air pollutant." Id. § 7411(a)(3).
48. Moving sources, essentially motor vehicles, are governed by Subchapter II of
the Clean Air Act. Id. §§ 7521-74.
49. Id. §§ 7401(a)(3), 7410(a)(1).
50. "The arcane knowledge essential to resolve ...disputes [over appropriate air
pollution control measures under the Act] is foreign to non-experts, including judges."
Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air v. Davis, 932 F.2d 256, 260 (3d Cir.
1991).
51. Primary pollutants are those which may affect public health. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7409(b)(1) (1988).
52. Secondary pollutants are those which may affect the public welfare, including
aesthetics. Id. § 7409(b)(2).
53. Id. § 7409. NAAQS now exist for sulfur dioxide, particulates, carbon monoxide, ozone and hydrocarbons, nitrogen dioxide, and lead. 40 C.F.R. § 50 (1988).
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-79 (1988); 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.24, 52.21 (1988). PSDs are
imposed to prevent newly constructed sources or modifications to sources from causing
serious decreases in air quality. Id.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(D)(1)(A) (Supp. 1991).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 51.18(j)-(k), 52.24, § 51 App. S (1991).
In nonattainment areas, any business proposing source construction or modification must
obtain reductions from other sources that will at least offset the additional pollution it
will be emitting. Id.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1988).
58. Id. § 7412. These standards are set at levels which provide an "ample margin
of safety to protect the public," 40 C.F.R. § 50.2(b) (1991), a tougher standard than the
NAAQS, which are set at levels providing an "adequate margin of safety." Id. There are
numerous hazardous pollutants, including beryllium, asbestos, mercury, vinyl chloride,
benzene, inorganic arsenic, radon from underground mines, and radionuclides. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412 (1988).

Enforcement of the Act is generally to be done by the states.

9

The Act authorizes both criminal and civil penalties in the event of
the emission of air pollutants not permitted under the statute.60
Monetary fines, imprisonment, or both may be imposed on "any responsible corporate officer." 61 The Act also authorizes citizen suits,
both against emission sources to enforce control requirements and

against the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to enforce its
non-discretionary duties.6 2

A potential investor should consider the effects compliance with
the Clean Air Act will have on business operating costs. If investment in an ongoing business is contemplated, these costs may be relatively easy to identify; however, the current degree of compliance
should be examined. If planning expansion or new construction, the
investor should determine if the site location is in a nonattainment
area or has the PSD requirements which might affect the ability or
cost of doing so. Thus, location can be very important in determining
cost of compliance.63
C. Federal Water Pollution and Control Act
The Federal Water Pollution and Control Act of 1972 (Clean
Water Act)64 regulates discharges of pollutants 5 into "navigable
waters," 6 defined to include the "waters of the United States."6 7 Title III of the Act requires the EPA to set technology-based "effluent

limitations" 6 8 on discharges from "point sources."'

The EPA has

59. Id. §§ 7401(a)(3), 7410 (a)(1). See also Humphrey & Paddock, The Federal
and State Roles in Environmental Enforcement: A Proposalfor a More Effective and
More Efficient Relationship, 14 HARV. ENV. L. REv. 7, 14-15 (1990).
60. 42 U.S.C §§ 7413(c), 7420 (1988) (civil penalties); id. § 7413(d) (criminal
penalties).
61. Id. § 7413(c)(3).
62. Id. § 7604(a).
63. Id. § 7420.
64. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
65. The Clean Water Act defines "pollutant" broadly, id. § 1362(6), and includes
in its definition "chemical waste" and "industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water." Id.
66. See generally id. § 1251.
67. Id. § 1362(7). The definition of "waters of the United States" is extremely
broad. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (1991). The Act unquestionably covers more than waters that
are navigable in fact. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121
(1985) (holding non-navigable wetlands covered). However, groundwaters are probably
not covered. See Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310 (5th Cir. 1977); Kelly v. United
States, 618 F. Supp. 1103 (W.D. Mich. 1985); United States v. GAF, 389 F. Supp. 1379
(S.D. Tex. 1975).
68. An "effluent limitation" is "any restriction ... on quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents which are discharged
from point sources." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (1988).
69. A "point source" is "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including.., any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit.., from which pollutants are or may be
discharged." Id. § 1362(14).
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issued effluent limitations for a number of pollutants 7° Discharges of
toxic pollutants are regulated under stricter standards. 71 Oil
spills
72
and hazardous substance spills are also specially regulated.

Enforcement under the Clean Water Act is primarily effected
through the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination

System

(NPDES) permit.7 No discharge into waters is permitted without a

NPDES permit. 74 Permitted discharges are overseen by enforcing

agencies that periodically review monitoring reports, 5 but the Act
also gives private citizens the right to bring civil suit on their own

behalf against anyone alleged to be in violation of the Act.7e Additionally, the EPA has the power to either issue an administrative

order or seek an injunction to force compliance with effluent limitation and permit standards. The EPA may also assess civil penalties

of up to $10,000 for each day the violation continues.77

Like the discharge restrictions of the Clean Air Act, the limita-

tions of the Clean Water Act may impose operating costs on a business beyond those with which a foreign investor may be familiar. It
is prudent to identify these costs before making an investment, particularly in a new business venture. An investor should also evaluate

whether an existing target business is in compliance with discharge
requirements, because failure to comply may subject the business to

liability.

70. 40 C.F.R. § 401 (1991).
71. 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (1988).
72. Id.§ 1321.
73. Id.§ 1342. The NPDES regulations are at 40 C.F.R. §§ 121-125 (1991). See
generally Humphrey & Paddock, supra note 59, at 17-18.
74. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (1988). "Discharge of a pollutant" includes "(A) any
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source, (B) any addition of
any pollutant to the ...ocean from any point source other than a vessel." Id. The scope
of the Act is broad enough to cover runoff from parking lots and other open spaces as
well. 40 C.F.R. § 122.26 (1991).
75. 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.41(k)(6), 122.42(a) (1991). The frequency of required reports is governed by the terms of the permit, but must be at least annual. Toxic discharges must be reported within twenty-four hours. Id.
76. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988). See, e.g., Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd., 484 U.S. 49 (1987); Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. AT & T
Bell Labs., 617 F. Supp. 1190 (D.N.J. 1985); Legal Envtl. Assistance Found. v. Hodel,
586 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Tenn. 1984).
77. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (1988).

D. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) 8
specifically regulates the generation, storage, transportation, treatment, and disposal of hazardous waste. 9 Hazardous waste is certain
listed waste or other waste which is ignitable, 80 corrosive, 81 reactive,82 or toxic.8 3 The RCRA requires that any person generating or
transporting hazardous waste, or the owner or operator of a hazardous waste treatment, storage, or disposal facility must apply for a
permit and comply with applicable requirements. 84 Generally, a generator may not accumulate hazardous waste onsite for more than
ninety days before being considered the operator of a storage facility
and thus subject to extensive permitting requirements.8" All shipments of hazardous waste are tracked from generation to disposal
through shipping documents known as "manifests."8 " Certain generators may be qualified as "small quantity generators, ' 87 for which
record keeping requirements may be relaxed.88
RCRA requires EPA to establish standards for owners and operators of hazardous waste disposal facilities. These include requirements for ffnancial responsibility for possible releases of hazardous
waste.89 Owners and operators of surface impoundments, landfills,
and treatment facilities must maintain insurance coverage of at least
$3 million per occurrence.90
RCRA provides various enforcement mechanisms. The Act authorizes EPA to assess civil penalties up to $25,000 per day for each
violation of the Act. 9 ' Those receiving criminal penalties are subject

78. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-91i (1988).
79.

Id.

80. 40 C.F.R. § 261.21 (1991).

81. Id. § 261.22.
82. Id. § 261.23.
83. Id. § 261.24.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (1988). See 40 C.F.R. §§ 262-265 (1990). Among the rules
prescribed for generators and transporters are pre-transport requirements and rules for
manifesting, record keeping and reporting, exports and imports of hazardous waste, and
dealing with hazardous waste discharges. The rules for owners and operators of hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities set forth extensive and specific requirements for record keeping, operation, and closure of such facilities.
85. 40 C.F.R. § 262.34 (1991).
86. Id. §§ 262(B), 263(B).
87. Id. § 261.5.
88. Id. Generally, a small quantity generator is one which generates no more than
one hundred kilograms of hazardous waste in a month. Id.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1988).
90. 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.147(b), 265.147(b) (1990) (requiring $3 million coverage for
"non-sudden accidental occurrences;" $6 million for "sudden accidental occurrences").
91. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(g) (1989).
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to fines of up to $50,000 per day for first convictions as well as imprisonment.92 EPA can sue to immediately restrain a person contributing to the "imminent and substantial endangerment" 93 resulting
from the handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of
any solid or hazardous waste, as those terms are defined by the
Act.94 RCRA also permits private parties to sue to enforce RCRA
permits or standards, to enjoin RCRA violators, to seek an order
that necessary action be taken by EPA or others, and to seek application of the Act's civil penalties.95
E.

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act

Broadly stated, while RCRA regulates ongoing hazardous waste
operations, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) 96 addresses the cleanup
of waste from previous activities.9 7 CERCLA makes available both
public98 and private99 money to fund hazardous waste cleanup.
CERCLA has spawned an industry of environmental consulting and
lawyering. When confounded by various perceived mistakes and
omissions in the drafting of CERCLA, judges have regularly interpreted liability expansively.1 00
Liability under CERCLA is the most dangerous and surprising
type of environmental liability, and it can be an expensive ailment.
The EPA had identified 33,834 sites as potentially hazardous as of
December 31, 1990.11 Although 1,126 of these sites have been listed
on the EPA's National Priority List of contaminated sites, only
92. Id. § 6928(d).
93. Id. § 6973.
94. See id. §§ 6934, 6972-73.
95. Id. § 6972(a)(1).
96.

42 U.S.C. § 9601-75 (1988).

97. Id. Congress made significant changes to CERCLA in the Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-400, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
Courts and practitioners sometimes refer to SARA's provisions separately. However, because it is not important for the purposes of this article to distinguish between the original CERCLA provisions and those of SARA, this article refers only to CERCLA.
98. CERCLA's Hazardous Substance Response Fund is available to pay for
"governmental response costs." 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (1988).
99. For a discussion of the liability of private entities under CERCLA, see infra
text accompanying notes 105-256.
100. See, e.g., United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Co., 546 F. Supp. 1112 (D.
Minn. 1982)("CERCLA should be given a broad and liberal construction").
101. N. Y. Times, June 16, 1991, § 3, at 1.

sixty-three sites have been cleaned up. 0 2 The EPA estimates the av-

erage cleanup cost' 03 of a site to be $30 million; as much as $750
million may need to be spent to comply with CERCLA's
standards. 04

1. Scope of CERCLA Liability
The broad scope of CERCLA liability makes it especially significant to potential investors. CERCLA liability attaches in the event
100
of an actual or threatened "release"' 10 of a "hazardous substance"'
into the environment. 107 There is no minimum standard for a release.
Any traceable amount of a hazardous substance is sufficient to support liability. 08 This refusal to recognize a de minimus exception
greatly increases the likelihood that a legally significant release will
occur.
Liability imposed by CERCLA is strict, without regard to fault,

knowledge, or intent. 0 9 Under a strict liability standard, causation is
not at issue." 0 Instead, a party need only be within one of CERCLA's defined categories of potentially responsible parties to be liable."' These broad categories include past and current owners or
operators of facilities at which a release has occurred," 2 those who
arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances at the place of
102. Id.
103. Cleanup costs, called "response costs" in CERCLA, may include costs of
monitoring, investigation, laboratory fees, and the fees of contractors and consultants.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(23)-(25) (.1988); Velsicol v. Reilly Tar and Chem. Corp., 21
Env't Rep. (BNA) 2118 (E.D. Tenn. 1984). At least one court has held that attorney's
fees incurred in pursuing response costs are recoverable. General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1390
(1991). The cost of lawyers, engineering studies, and record keeping have more than
doubled the cost of some cleanups. N. Y. Times, June 16, 1991, § 3, at 1.
104. Id. Just six years before, the average cleanup cost was estimated to be $12
million. 15 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1395 (Dec. 21, 1984).
105. "Release" is broadly defined to include a spilling, leaking, dumping, or "disposing" into the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1988). "Disposal" has been construed to include the migration or leaking of waste from its initial location. United States
v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 200 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) broadly defines the term "hazardous substance." The
definition includes any substance designated hazardous or toxic under the Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1317(a), 1321(b)(2)(A) (1988); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9602 (1988);
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6921; the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412; and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (1988). However, the definition explicitly exempts
many petroleum and natural gas products. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988).
108. See Eagle-Pitcher Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 922, 927-31 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
109. E.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988); New
York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1986). Liability under CERCLA is the same as that imposed by the Clean Water Act, which imposes strict liability.
42 U.S.C. 9601(32) (1989).
110. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
11. United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060-61 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
112. See infra notes 132-41 and accompanying text.
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release, 113 and those who transported the hazardous substances to

the place of release." 4 If either an investor or the business invested

in falls within one of the enumerated categories of liable parties, the

investor may be liable for at least some portion of the cleanup costs.

The liability of any responsible party is joint and several."x 5 Courts

have recognized that "if there are distinct harms that are capable of
division, then liability should be apportioned according to the contri-

bution of each defendant.""x 6 However, unless a defendant can meet
the burden of showing a reasonable basis for apportionment,"17 any
one responsible party may be held liable for all cleanup costs incurred .1 8 An investor can thus be liable for the entire cost of
cleanup if other responsible parties cannot be located or are not solvent." 9 This puts particular pressure on the deep pocket investor to

avoid liability under CERCLA.
CERCLA provides that either government

20

or private parties' 2 '

may bring actions to recover cleanup costs. Because any potentially

responsible party may thus seek contribution from any other party
who may be liable under section 9607(a), the harsh results of joint

and several liability are somewhat mitigated. 2 2 CERCLA also implicitly recognizes the validity of indemnification agreements among

113. See infra notes 142-48 and accompanying text.
114. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1989). For a discussion of transporters, see infra text
accompanying notes 149-50.
115. Under joint and several, or "entire" liability, "a defendant might be liable for
the entire loss sustained by the plaintiff, even though the defendant's act concurred or
combined with that of another wrongdoer to produce the result ....
" W. KEETON, supra
note 23, § 47.
116. United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
117. United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1395 (D.N.H.
1985).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Medley, 25 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1315 (D.S.C.
1986); Ottati & Goss, 630 F. Supp. at 1395; United States v. South Carolina Recycling
and Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 994 (D.S.C. 1986).
119. Joint and several liability has been described as EPA's "atom bomb." N. Y.
Times, June 16, 1991, § 3, at 1.
120. Under § 9606, the EPA may order a responsible party to take action in certain cases in which the EPA determines that an actual or threatened release poses an
imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare. 42 U.S.C. §
9606 (1989). Alternatively, the EPA can perform cleanup work itself and then seek reimbursement from responsible parties in a cost recovery action. Id. §§ 9604,
9607(a)(4)(A).
121. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
122. Id. § 9613(0(1). See also Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, Inc.,
691 F. Supp. 1100 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (listing factors considered in apportioning liability
among responsible parties).

private parties.' 23 However, these agreements do not124shield any potentially liable party from suits by the government.

The broad scope of CERCLA makes it virtually impossible to contest liability under the EPA cleanup orders. 125 Courts cannot hear a
pre-enforcement challenge to the specifics of a government-ordered
cleanup.'2 " Moreover, the EPA can assess stiff fines against parties
refusing to comply with its cleanup orders. 27 Once a responsible
party acting pursuant to a cleanup order incurs costs, it may only
recover those costs to the extent it can demonstrate that the EPA's
selection of the response action ordered was illegal or "arbitrary and
capricious.' 28
Finally, liability is retroactive. 29 The fact that CERCLA imposes
liability on parties for acts occurring prior to the enactment of CERCLA has not been held to violate due process.130 Thus, companies
are liable for response costs associated with releases occurring before
1980, when CERCLA was enacted.
2. Statutorily Responsible Parties

The effect of CERCLA depends largely on the construction of the
descriptions of four categories of responsible parties. Generally, responsible parties are the current and past owners or operators of facilities from which a hazardous substance has been released, those
who arranged for disposal of hazardous substances at such facilities,
123. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e) (1989).
124. Id.
125. Id. § 9606(a).
126. See id. § 9613(h) (codifying pre-SARA case law). Prior to 1986, courts either did not view an EPA order as a final action or held that a cost recovery action under
CERCLA was an adequate remedy in court for review. See, e.g., Solid State Circuits,
Inc. v. EPA, 812 F.2d 383, 388-92 (8th Cir. 1987); J.V. Peters & Co. v. EPA, 767 F.2d
263 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361 (D.N.H.
1985).
Courts have also remarked that to permit pre-enforcement review would debilitate the
primary purpose of the law, which is to assure prompt cleanups. J.V. Peters,767 F.2d at
264 (citing Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 600 F. Supp. 1487, 1495 (D.N.J. 1985)).
127. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606(b)(1), 9607(c)(3) (1989). For example, the EPA is authorized to fine violators $25,000 for each day the violation or failure to comply with an
abatement order continues. Id. Additionally, a person who "fails without sufficient cause
to properly provide removal or remedial action upon order of [the EPA]" may be liable
for punitive damages in an amount equal to three times the EPA's costs. Id.
§ 9607(c)(3).
128. Id. § 9606(b)(2)(D).
129. See, e.g., Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1096 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom., Frey v. Reilly, 111 S.Ct. 509 (1990); United States v. Allied-Signal Corp., 736 F.
Supp. 1553, 1557 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
' 130. E.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d
726, 732-34 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
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and those who transported the hazardous substances to such facilities.' 3 ' An understanding of the operation of CERCLA begins with
an understanding of the individuals and entities that may be deemed
responsible parties.
The current "owner or operator of a vessel or a facility ...

from

which there is a release ' 1 is one of the explicitly liable parties
under CERCLA.1 3' The Act defines an "owner or operator" to be:
"in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore facility, any person
owning or operating such facility, and in the case of any abandoned
facility, any person who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately prior to such abandonment."' 13
The ramifications of owner/operator liability can be staggering for
purchasers of American real estate or businesses. Pursuant to strict
liability principles, 13 5 the current owner or operator of a facility is
liable even if it never released hazardous wastes there and even if no
hazardous waste was released there during the period of current
ownership or operation. 3 6 Section 9607(a) "does not require that the
present owner contribute to the release, but merely that [the party]
is the present owner of the facility where there has been a release or
threat of release of a hazardous substance.' ' 13" Accordingly, anyone
buying contaminated property is a responsible party under CERCLA and is thus potentially liable for the full cost of cleanup. This is
true even if the property is leased to a third party. 38
The second category of liable party under CERCLA is the owner
or operator at the time of disposal. 3 9 On the face of the statute,
those who owned or operated the facility between the disposal and
the current ownership or operation would not be responsible parties.

131. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
132. Id. § 9607(a)(1).
133. Id.
134. Id. § 9601(20)(A) (1989). "Facility" is defined to include any area where a
hazardous substance is stored, disposed of, or spilled. Id. § 9601(9).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 38-44.
136. See, e.g., United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1063 (C.D. Cal.
1987) (granting sua sponte partial summary judgment against present owner based on
strict liability).
137. Id.
138. E.g., United States v. Argent Corp., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20616
(D.N.M. 1984) (holding lessor of facility liable because contractual relationship formed
by lease precluded third party defense).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1989). "Any person who at the time of disposal of
any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of" is potentially liable. Id.

However, some courts have broadly construed the term "disposal"' 40
to apply to the continuous, ongoing migration or leaching of hazardous substances.'

41

Thereby those courts have found every owner or

operator of contaminated property between the owner or operator at
the time of disposal and the current owner or operator to be liable

for a release.
The third set of liable parties under CERCLA are those who "arranged for" disposal or treatment of hazardous substances. 42 Arrangers liable under CERCLA have typically been generators of
hazardous substances.' 43 Liability attaches whether or not the arranger generated the hazardous substances. 44 No ownership or
physical possession of the hazardous substances is required to establish arranger liability. 45 However, courts have generally refused to
find arranger liability in limited instances when the defendant sold a
useful product containing
hazardous substances, and the product was
46
later disposed of.'
Potential investors should be cognizant of the possibility that they
can be liable under CERCLA for cleanup costs incurred at a site
other than one they own if hazardous substances they arranged to
dispose of are released into the environment. 47 This off site liability
is particularly vexing because the arranger lacks control over the circumstances leading to the release. Because CERCLA liability is
strict, 148 the fact that the arranger may have taken precautions to

140. Id.
141. E.g., Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568,
1573 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 185
(W.D. Mo. 1985). But see Ecodyne Corp. v. Shah, 718 F. Supp. 1454 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
(disagreeing with "continuous release" theory).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1991). An arranger is: "any person who by contract,
agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment ... of hazardous substances
owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances." Id.
143. Practitioners often use only the term "generator" to refer to this category of
liable parties. However, this article uses the term "arranger" because the scope of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1988) is not limited to those who generate hazardous
substances. See United States v. A & F Materials Co., 582 F. Supp. 842, 845 (S.D. I11.
1984) (attaching liability to any party making "the crucial decision how [the hazardous
waste] would be dislosed of or treated, and by whom").
144. United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1306 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
145. See, e.g., United States v. N.E. Pharmaceutical & Chem Co., 810 F.2d 726,
743 (8th Cir. 1986).
146. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313 (11th
Cir. 1990) (no liability for sale of transformers which leaked PCBs 40 years later); but
see New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (sale of transformer oil to a dragstrip for dust control not a sale of a useful product, but intended to
be a disposal).
147. E.g., United States v. Mottolo, 629 F. Supp. 56, 59-60 (D.N.H. 1984).
148. See supra text accompanying note 109.
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see that the disposal was safe and legal will not be a defense to liability. While an arranger can seek contribution from the wrongdoers,
those entities may be bankrupt or dissolved. CERCLA's joint and
several liability can make the relatively blameless arranger the
source of substantial cleanup funds.
Transporters are the fourth category of party explicitly liable
under section 9607 of CERCLA. 14 9 Transporters are parties who
accept hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment
facilities. If response costs are later incurred by a release of the hazardous substance, the transporter becomes a liable party.1 50 Perhaps
because the statutory definition is very clear, there has been no reported litigation over the scope of transporter liability.
3.

Judge-Made "Controller" Liability

CERCLA's identification of responsible parties, while far from
plain, makes owners, operators, arrangers, and transporters liable for
response costs. Through expansive interpretations of the definitions
of owner, operator, and arranger, however, CERCLA liability has
been imposed on parties not explicitly listed in the statute, including
parent corporations;' 5 ' corporate stdckholders, directors, and officers; 52 and employees with control over disposal decisions.' 5 3 Even
lenders may be liable by virtue of their perceived control over waste
149. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1991).
150. Id.
151. E.g., State Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 468
A.2d 150 (1983) (liability against parent corporation who could have controlled conduct
of 100% owned subsidiary). But see FMC Corp. v. Northern Pump Co., 668 F. Supp.
1285 (D. Minn. 1987) (parent ownership of all stock, common board of directors, some
common officers, and lease from parent to subsidiary found insufficient to hold former
parent liable as agent).
152. E.g., United States v. Carolawn Co., 14 Envt'l. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20699 (D.S.C. 1984) (holding three corporate officers liable under CERCLA because
they were responsible for the day to day operations of the disposal facility); United
States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (93 % shareholder
and president potentially liable under CERCLA because of close involvement with day to
day operations at site); United States v. N.E. Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d
726 (8th Cir. 1986) (majority shareholders and officers held liable under CERCLA because they actively participated in management of facility); New York v. Shore Realty
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (owning stockholder who managed the corporation
held liable under CERCLA and New York law without piercing the corporate veil).
153. E.g., United States v. N.E. Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 74244 (8th Cir. 1986) (plant supervisor who had "actual control" over generator company's
hazardous substances "possessed" such substances for purposes of 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(3)).

disposal activities. 15 '

It is particularly important that potential investors be aware that
general principles of limited corporate liability have not shielded indivfduals from CERCLA liability. In finding such liability, courts
have not necessarily "pierced the corporate veil"' 16 of limited liability. Rather, courts have deemed the accused individual or corporate
shareholders, and corporate employees, to be directly liable as
owners or operators within the meaning of CERCLA's statutory definitions.' 6 These decisions have almost always focused on the party's
degree of control over the handling or disposal of a company's hazardous substances.
A seminal decision finding such direct individual liability is New
York v. Shore Realty Corp. 57 One of the defendants was Donald
LeoGrande, a Shore Realty stockholder and officer.'" In evaluating
CERCLA's definition of "owner or operator," the court concentrated
on the phrase "owned, operated or otherwise controlled activities at
[the] facility.' 59 The court interpreted this language to mean that
an owning stockholder who manages a corporation, such as LeoGrande, is liable under CERCLA as an owner or operator. Furthermore, the court suggested that active management may not be
necessary to trigger liability: "[Iln any event, LeoGrande is in
charge of the operation of the facility in question, and as such is an
'operator' within the meaning of CERCLA."' 60
Many courts, embracing the "in charge" aspect of Shore Realty,
have held that an individual or entity may be liable for response
costs incurred by a corporation solely by virtue of mere capacity to
control, whatever the level of control actually exercised.' 6' Various
factors have led courts to conclude that an entity or individual has
the capacity to control a facility. For example, in United States v.
N.E. Pharmaceutical& Chem. Co.,'62 the Eighth Circuit court of
appeals held the president of the N.E. Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co.
154. See infra text accompanying notes 245-56, discussing United States v. Fleet
Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (lth Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
155. See infra notes 176-90 and accompanying text.
156. United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1203 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
"There is, of course, no basis, under CERCLA, to distinguish between the liability of an
individual stockholder who actively participates in the management of a corporation and
a corporate stockholder which so participates. Both individuals and corporations are included within the definition of 'person' under [42 U.S.C. § 9601(21)]." Id.
157. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
158. Id. at 1052.
159. Id.
160. Id. (emphasis added).
161. E.g., Kelly v. Thomas Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp. 1532 (W.D. Mich. 1989);
United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Idaho v. Bunker Hill
Co., 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986).
162. 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
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(NEPACCO) liable as a "contributor"' 3 under RCRA. Although
he was a major stockholder, he had no knowledge of a plan to dispose of hazardous waste, and he was not present at the plant during
the period of waste disposal.' The court claimed to use an analysis
of personal liability similar to the analysis it would apply under
CERCLA. The court then held that, although the president was
"not personally involved in the actual decision to transport and dispose of the hazardous substances," 6 ' he in fact was "in charge of
and directly responsible for all of NEPACCO's operations, . . . and
he had the ultimate authority to control the disposal of NEPACCO's
hazardous substances."' 66
Another decision finding owner liability for a shareholder based on
actual participation in management is United States v. Kayser-Roth
Corp.11 Through a merger, Kayser-Roth became the sole shareholder of Stamina Mills, a textile manufacturer that had been operating for fourteen years prior to the merger,' 68 Stamina Mills
dissolved in 1977. In the mid-1980s, the EPA brought suit against
Kayser-Roth to recover cleanup costs incurred in remediating
groundwater contamination at the Stamina Mills property.6 " Kayser-Roth attempted to escape liability by arguing that it had never
been the owner or operator of the Stamina Mills plant.1 0
The court found Kayser-Roth to be an operator because KayserRoth exercised control over Stamina Mills. Persuasive evidence of
Kayser-Roth's control included its authority over money and budgets, its requirement that government environmental inquiries be forwarded to it, its power to disapprove real estate transaction, and the
placement of Kayser-Roth personnel in almost all executive positions.'' Other courts have considered additional factors to find capacity to control. 172
163. Id. at 745-46 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (1986)).
164. Id. at 745.
165. Id. at 744.
166. Id.
167. 724 F. Supp. 15 (D.R.I. 1989).
168. Id. at 18.
169. Id. at 17.
170. Id. at 21.
171. Id.
172. These factors include: (1) ability to make timely discovery of unlawful discharges, Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 672 (D. Idaho 1986); United States
v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989); (2) supervision of persons controlling the mechanisms which caused the pollution, Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp: at 672; Kelly
v. Thomas Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp. 1532, 1542-44 (W.D. Mich. 1989); (3) ability to
prevent or abate damages, Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 672; Nicolet, 712 F. Supp. at

Not all courts have viewed CERCLA liability so broadly.1"' However, the reliance of many courts on capacity to control can impose

very broad liability and thus should be of concern to potential investors. While most courts following the capacity to control test have

also cited and relied upon facts demonstrating actual control, 74 numerous courts have expressed the view that liability depends only
upon capacity to control. Under these cases, foreign parent corporations may be liable for the CERCLA transgressions of their United
States subsidiaries merely through the normal involvement of a parent in a subsidiary. 175 Deep pocket parent corporations, as well as
individual employees and stockholders, should be aware of this potential for liability.
4. Indirect Liability of Shareholders: Piercing the
Corporate Veil

In the cases discussed above, courts interpreted the section
9607(a) categories to include individuals or entities related to the
offending corporate conduct. In other cases, courts have held corporate stockholders liable for CERCLA response costs, not because
those stockholders were owners, operators or arrangers, but because
the tests were met
for piercing the common law protection of the
"corporate veil.' 76
Generally a stockholder, whether a corporation or individual
stockholder, is not responsible for the liabilities of the corporation in
1204; United States v. N.E. Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 849 (W.D.
Mo. 1984); Thomas Solvent, 727 F. Supp. at 1544; (4) benefit from the waste disposal
practices in effect, Nicolet, 712 F. Supp. at 1204; (5) presence or indicia of ownership,
id.; (6) whether the corporation is closely held, Quadion Corp. v. Mache, 738 F. Supp.
270, 274 (N.D. Ill. 1990); N.E. Pharmaceutical& Chem. Co., 810 F.2d at 726; and (7)
whether the individual holds the position of officer or director, Thomas Solvent, 727 F.
Supp. at 1543-44.
A closely held corporation is one in which the shares are held by a single shareholder
or closely knit group of shareholders. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 257 (3d ed. 1983). A closely held corporation offers the limited liability of a corporation while retaining some of the internal
management attributes of an individual proprietorship or partnership. Id.
173. E.g., Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990). The
court held that James, the parent corporation of a party's predecessor company, was not
directly liable as an "owner or operator" under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) because "CERCLA does not define 'owners' or 'operators' as including the parent company of offending
wholly-owned subsidiaries." Id. at 82-83. "[Ifl Congress [had] wanted to extend the
[CERCLA] liability to parent corporations it could have done so, and it remains free to
do so." Id. at 83.
174. See, e.g., FMC v. Northern Pump, 668 F. Supp. 1285 (D. Minn. 1987) (refusing to impose liability on a parent corporation not involved in the day to day management or fiscal affairs of the liable subsidiary); Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822
(D. Vt. 1988) (relying on actual, asserted control to hold individual shareholders liable).
175. See Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 672 (D. Idaho 1986) (expressing concern over such potential liability).
176. E.g., United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
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which it owns stock. Liability is limited to the assets of the corporation. However, in certain circumstances, courts are willing to disregard the corporate form, or pierce the corporation veil, for purposes

of assessing liability. Then they will treat assets of the shareholders
of the7 corporation
as though they were the assets of the corporation
17

itself.

Typically, the courts will pierce the corporate veil ih two limited

situations: (1) when the corporation and its stockholders share such
a unity of interest that, by all objective measures, they do not exist

as separate entities, and (2) when an inequitable result would follow
if the acts giving rise to liability are treated as those of the corpora-

tion.178 Corporate veil piercing also applies between parent corpora-

tions and their subsidiaries. 17 9 In the area of environmental tort

liability, the "federal common law [of corporate veil piercing] borrows heavily from state law."'8s0

The potentially severe consequences of veil piercing for a foreign

81
corporation are demonstrated in United States v. Arkwright, Inc.'

In Arkwright, the defendant foreign parent corporation moved for
summary judgment of a CERCLA claim for lack of personal juris-

diction.

s2

Although there was an admitted absence of minimum

contacts between the defendant parent corporation and the forum
See generally 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE COR§ 41.10 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990).
178. See Orloff v. Allman, 819 F.2d 904, 908-09 (9th Cir. 1987).
179. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 172, § 148. Corporate separateness is
not recognized where:
(a) The business transactions, property, employees, bank and other accounts
and records of the corporations are intermingled;
(b) The formalities of separate corporate procedures for each corporation are
not observed;
(c) The corporation is inadequately financed as a separate unit from the point
of view of meeting its normal obligations foreseeable in a business of its size
and character;
(d)The respective enterprises are not held out to the public as separate
enterprises;
(e) The policies of the corporation are not directed to its own interests primarily but rather to those of the other corporation.
Id.
180. United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 20 (D.R.I. 1989).
181. 697 F. Supp. 1229 (D.N.H. 1988).
182. Id. at 1138. The constitution protects a defendant's liberty interest in not
being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which the defendant has established no meaningful "contacts, ties or relations." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
319 (1945)). A defendant meets the minimum contacts test for personal jurisdiction if
the defendant purposefully directs its activities at residents of the forum state and the
litigation arises from injuries related to those activities. Id. at 472.
177.

PORATIONS

state of New Hampshire, the court found that the parent corporation, OCE Van Der Grinten N.V. (OCE), was nevertheless subject
to jurisdiction. The court disregarded corporate separateness between Arkwright and OCE because: (1) OCE owned 100% of Arkwright's stock; (2) Arkwright's capital -and operating budget were
subject to OCE's approval; (3) OCE performed internal audits of
Arkwright; (4) OCE guaranteed Arkwright's lines of credit; and (5)
any significant financial decisions made by Arkwright required
ap83
proval by the OCE directors who sat on Arkwright's board.1
In contrast to judicial willingness to impose direct liability, other
courts are reluctant to pierce the corporate veil. The Fifth Circuit,
for example, refused to pierce the corporate veil in Joslyn Mfg. v.
T.L. James & Co.,"" stating that "veil piercing should be limited to
situations in which the corporate entity is used as a sham to perpetrate a fraud or avoid personal liability." " Accordingly, when the
district court had run through its laundry list of veil piercing factors
and found that the facts did not justify piercing the corporate veil,
and when the facts did not support any finding that the subsidiary
was a "bogus shell" 8 6 for the parent to hide behind, no veil piercing
was allowed.'""
In New York v. Shore Realty Corp.,' the Second Circuit upheld
the corporate form even when it found the corporation's managing
stockholder directly liable as an owner or operator. 89 The court
stated that:
Both the New York Court of Appeals and this court have been quite insistent that the corporate form will not be disregarded unless the opposing
party shows that the corporate form is being used fraudulently or as a
-means of carrying on business for personal rather than corporate ends. The
State's claim has not at this stage risen to that level. 190

As a practical matter, corporate veil piercing is unlikely even in
the context of expansive liability for environmental cleanup. Investors who incorporate to protect their personal assets are careful to
183.

Arkwright, 697 F. Supp. at 1139.

184. 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1017 (1991).
185. Id. at 83 (emphasis in original).
186. Id. at 84.
187. Id. In Joslyn, Lincoln Creosoting Co. was incorporated in 1935 under an arrangement whereby T.L. James & Co. would put up the initial capital in exchange for
the stock of the company. Lincoln ran a creosoting operation from which it discharged
chemicals until it was sold to Joslyn in 1950. Joslyn operated the plant until Koppers
bought it in 1969. In the action before the fifth circuit, Joslyn asserted a right to sue
James as an owner or operator of the plant by virtue of its stock ownership in Lincoln.
Id.
188. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
189. Id. at 1052. See supra text accompanying notes 157-60.
190. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1032 (citation omitted).
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observe corporate formalities. Courts are generally reluctant to disregard the function served by the corporate form of promoting business enterprises and fulfilling business expectations.
5. Liability of Acquiring Companies in Mergers and
Acquisitions
When two companies merge through typical state law procedures,
the surviving corporation retains the obligations of the merged entities. 91 Accordingly, if a corporate investor acquires a company
through merger, the surviving corporation will retain the environmental liabilities of the acquired corporation, whether those liabilities were acquired by contract, operation of comm6n law, or statute.
The purchaser of a corporation's assets is generally treated differently. An investor who purchases assets traditionally does not
assume the seller's liabilities. However, four exceptions to this rule
apply when: (1) the purchasing corporation expressly or impliedly
agrees to assume the seller's liability; (2) the transaction amounts to
a de facto merger of the purchaser and seller; (3) the purchasing
corporation is merely a continuation of the selling corporation; or
(4)
19 2
the transaction is entered into fraudulently to escape liability.
The first and fourth exceptions are relatively simple and require
little discussion. The parties to an asset purchase are free to allocate
their respective rights and obligations among themselves and the
courts will respect such agreements. 9 3 However, when there is actual evidence of fraud, courts will not permit wrongdoers to hide behind an asset purchase to avoid liability.'9
The other two exceptions are more complex. The transaction will
be considered a de facto merger when the following elements exist:
(a) continuation of the management, personnel, physical locations,
assets, or general business operation of the seller; (b) continuity of
shareholders resulting from the purchaser paying for the acquired
191.

15 W. FLETCHER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

§ 7121 (1983). Virtually all United States jurisdictions recognize that:

In case of merger of one corporation into another, where one of the corporations ceases to exist and the other corporation continues in existence, the latter
corporation is liable for the debts, contracts and torts of the former, at least to
the extent of the property and assets received, and this liability is often expressly imposed by statute.
Id. (footnotes omitted); Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d
86, 91 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989) (citing W. FLETCHER, supra).
192. Louisiana Pac. Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 1990).
193. 15 W. FLETCHER, supra note 191, § 7330.
194. Id.

assets with shares of its own stock; (c) cessation of the seller corporation's original business operations accompanied by liquidation and
dissolution as soon as practicably possible; and (d) assumption by the
purchasing corporation of the seller's obligations which would ordinarily be necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of the seller's
normal business operations.'
In Louisiana Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 9 6 the Ninth Circuit
refused to find a genuine issue of fact as to whether there was a de
facto merger because the continuity of shareholders element was not
present. The consideration paid by the acquiring corporation was a
combination of cash, a promissory note, and payment of some debts.
However, no stock of the acquiring company or its parent was
exchanged as part of the sale.197 There were common shareholders,
but they had bought their stock on the open market, and no former
shareholder owned more than two-and-one-half percent of the new
company. 98 The court affirmed the trial court's award of summary
judgment to the defendant. 99
When applying the exception for business enterprise continuation,
courts consider several factors: (a) continuity of employees, supervisory personnel, and physical location; (b) production of the same
product with the same name; (c) continuity of general business operations; and (d) purchaser holding itself out as a continuation of the
seller.200
The court in Louisiana Pacific considered the exception for business enterprise continuation as well as the de facto merger exception
when deciding liability under CERCLA. The court stated that the
continuing business exception would not be operative if the new corporation did not have notice of the old corporation's CERCLA liability or if the business which generated the waste had not continued. 01
However, other states recognize more expansive continuation liability for product line successors. 20 2 Under this doctrine, a court may
impose liability on the successor corporation for injuries caused by a
195. Louisiana Pac., 909 F.2d at 1263; Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc.,
762 F.2d 303, 310 (3d. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985).
196. 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990).
197. Id. at 1265.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1262.
200. Id. at 1265 (citing Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 175 (5th
Cir. 1985)); Oner II, Inc. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1979)).
201. Id. at 1265-66.
202. E.g., Martin v. Abbott Labs., 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984) (holding successor corporation liable when it acquired a manufacturing business and continued
the manufacture of its line of products); Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3,
136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977) (holding that when the successor corporation acquired a manufacturing business and continued the output of its line of products, the successor corporation was liable for defects in products manufactured by the predecessor business).
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defective product manufactured by the predecessor corporation. The
EPA policy argues that the product line exception applies to CERCLA actions if the successor corporation acquires the assets of the
predecessor corporation and substantially continues those business
operations.2 0 3 This is particularly dangerous in the CERCLA context: buying the assets of a corporation and continuing to produce
the same product could conceivably subject the new owner to any
liability of the predecessor business.
More than one exception to the traditional rule against liability
for the successor corporation can work in conjunction. In the
Acushnet River 0 4 case, the district court found a de facto merger

when Aerovox, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of RTE Corp.,
purchased the assets of Belleville Industries in exchange for RTE
stock.2 0° Aerovox continued to manufacture the same products as
Belleview had and sold them under the same name Belleview had
used. 206 The Belleview president, vice president, and treasurer all assumed the same positions at Aerovox and became Aerovox directors.
Aerovox used the same banking institutions, the same insurance
company, the same physical facilities and operated with the same
employees.2 0 7 Belleville dissolved shortly after the transaction. The
court found continuity of enterprise and held that Aerovox clearly
assumed all of the obligations of Belleville necessary to carry on its
business operations uninterrupted. 20 8 Despite a question of whether
there was continuity of shareholders, the court held that a de facto
merger had taken20place
and that such continuity was only one factor
9
to be considered.
Such a broad construction of the de facto merger exception is not
alone. A recent decision that rejected successor liability in a private
cost recovery action, Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,21* was

overruled by the Sixth Circuit.2 1' The lower court had reasoned that
because CERCLA did not mention successor corporations, but did
203. Courtney M. Price, Liability of CorporateShareholdersand Successor Corporationsfor Abandoned Sites under [CERCLA] (June 13, 1984) (EPA Memorandum).
204. In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1010 (D. Mass.
1989).
205. Id. at 1012.
206. Id. at 1015-16.
207. Id. at 1016.
208. Id. at 1017-19.
209. Id. at 1018.
210. 734 F. Supp. 793 (E.D. Mich. 1989), rev'd, 922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1991).
211. Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'g
734 F. Supp. 793 (E.D. Mich. 1989).

mention limited liability to the four section 9607(a) categories, 212
Congress had not intended to include successor corporations within
CERCLA. 2 1 The appellate court disagreed, reasoning that the ordinary meaning of the term "corporation," 2' ' one of the "persons" 2",
liable under CERCLA, included the successor corporation resulting
from a merger.21 6 The court found its broad interpretation to be consistent with the legislative intent of CERCLA to promote swift and
effective response to hazardous waste sites and to charge the
cost of
2 17
cleanup to those responsible for the hazardous conditions.
6. Liability of Dissolved Corporations
Another illustration of the expanse of CERCLA liability is that
even dissolved corporations may be liable for response costs. In
United States v. Sharon Steel Corp.,218 the court ruled that state
capacity statutes were preempted by federal law to the extent they
shielded a corporation otherwise liable under CERCLA. The court
stated that "if the effect of a state capacity statute is to limit the
liability of a party Congress meant to hold liable
for cleanup costs,
21
Congress intended CERCLA to preempt it."1 9
The reach of the holding in Sharon Steel is questionable. There
the dissolving corporation had not completed distributing its assets.220 It is difficult to understand how a court can impose liability
on a company with no remaining assets. 221 Some of the difficulties in
imposing liability on a dead company are that it has no legal capacity to be sued and is not amenable to service of process. 222 Moreover,
a corporation is an artificial person created solely by state law; 223 if
it no longer exists under state law, there is nothing left to sue.
Other courts have disagreed with the rationale in Sharon Steel.
The Ninth Circuit has suggested that state law will be used to determine whether an entity has "capacity to be sued. ' 22 4 This was the
212. See supra notes 131-50 and accompanying text.
213. 922 F.2d at 1244.
214. Id. at 1247.
215.

Id.

216. Id. at 1244.
217. Id. at 1247.
218. 681 F. Supp. 1492 (D. U.tah 1987).
219. Id. at 1498.
220. Id. ("Here, the funeral is still going on.")
221. See United States v. Distler, 741 F. Supp. 643 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (holding that
a dissolved corporation was "dead and buried," id. at 646, and not liable for costs related
to cleanup, although its successor may be).
222. 16A W. FLETCHER, supra note 191, § 8142.
223. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 172, § 78.
224.
1987).

Levins Metal Corp. v. Parr Richmond Terminal Co., 817 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir.
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same result reached by the Eighth Circuit in its N.E. Pharmaceuti2 25
cal & Chem. Co. decision.

7. Limitations on and Defenses to Liability
a. Explicit Statutory Defenses
CERCLA provides few defenses to liability. The only explicit defenses to liability require demonstrating, that a release resulted from
an act of God,2 2 6 an act of war,227 or solely from an act of a third
party. 228 The third party defense applies to any act or omission of a
third party which results in the actual or threatened release of a
hazardous substance. It does not apply when the third party is an
employee or agent of either the defendant or a party with whom the
defendant has a "contractual relationship. 2 29 A contractual relationship can be based on land contracts, deeds, or other instruments
transferring title or possession.2 30 Thus, the defendant who purchased property from an entity which was solely responsible for a
release on the property is not protected from liability.
b.

Innocent Landowner Protections

However, CERCLA does provide a defense for "innocent" 2 3 pur'232
chasers of land through its definition of "contractual relationship.
This defense is available if: (1) the defendant acquired the property
from which the hazardous substance was released after the disposal
or placement of the hazardous substance; and (2) the defendant can
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(a) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did not
know and had "no reason to know" after all appropriate inquiry consistent
with good commercial practices that any hazardous substance which is the
subject of the release was disposed of on, in, or at the facility;
(b) The defendant is a government entity which acquired the facility by

225. 810 F.2d 726, 746 (8th Cir. 1986).
226. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1) (1988). This defense has so far proven unsuccessful.
See, e.g., United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053 (C.D. Cal. 1987); United
States v. Multi-Chem, Inc., No. 84-0159 (W.D. Ky. August 1, 1989).
227. Id. § 9607(b)(2).
228. Id. § 9607(b)(3).
229. Id.
230. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1988).
231. The term "innocent landowner" is widely used in practice, but not in the
statute. See United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 716 F. Supp 1341, 1347
(D. Idaho 1989)(using term). The term must seem ironic to many blameless but strictly
liable landowners who do not qualify for the defense.
232. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (1988).

escheat, or through any other involuntary transfer or acquisition, or through
the exercise of eminent domain authority by purchase or condemnation; OR
(c) The defendant acquired the facility by inheritance or bequest; AND
(d) The defendant exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned and took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions
of any third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from
such acts or consequences. 33

It is difficult to qualify for "innocence" under CERCLA. The
concepts a nongovernmental defendant must use to demonstrate
compliance, "no reason to know," "all appropriate inquiry" under
the circumstances, and "due care" remain undefined. 234 Nevertheless, some courts have held purchasers to be qualified for innocent
landowner protection.235
c. Security Interest Protection

CERCLA explicitly exempts creditors from its "owner and operator" definition.2 36 The provision was intended to prevent lenders or
other creditors having ownership interests such as mortgages or

deeds of trust from incurring liability.23 7 However, the few courts
addressing this issue have interpreted the exemption narrowly,238
leading to extensive and expensive CERCLA liability for lenders.
In United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.,2 3 the court held

that a mortgage lender with a security interest in contaminated
property became liable as an owner under CERCLA when it acquired the property at the foreclosure sale.24 ° Once the lender had
233. Id. §§ 9601(35), 9607(b)(3).
234. Id.
235. E.g., United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1341 (D.
Idaho 1989). In the Pacific Hide case, the defendants had received shares in Pacific Hide
as a gift from their father, the business' founder. Id. at 1345. The United States sued to
recoup cleanup costs incurred at a recycling yard contaminated with PCBs that was
owned by Pacific Hide. Id. at 1343. The court found that the defendants, who had virtually no involvement with the business, had no reason to know of the release of PCBs. Id.
at 1348-49. The court further held that the defendants had made "all appropriate inquiry" required to qualify for the innocent landowner defense, even though they had
made no inquiry at all. Id. Because the presence of PCBs was not obvious and the defendants had no specialized knowledge or experience about PCBs or hazardous waste,
their failure to inspect was reasonable. Thus, they were not liable as owners or operators.
Id.
See also United States v. Serafini, 706 F. Supp. 346 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
236. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988). Exempted is any person "who, without participating in the management of a ... facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to
protect his security interest in the ... facility." Id.
237. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579-80 (D.
Md. 1986) (citing S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980).
238. The director of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.'s division of liquidations
has stated that more than four hundred properties seized by it contain hazardous waste
or asbestos, and that the liability associated with the materials could significantly increase the cost of the savings and loan bailout. N.Y. Times, July 20, 1990, at Dl, col. 5.
239. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986)
240. Id. at 575. The bank then held record title for four years before its motion for
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taken title, there was no security interest left to protect. The bank
thus became an owner and was liable for response costs under CERCLA.24 ' Other courts have reached this result on similar facts.242
However, in United States v. Mirabile,24' another district court
held that a foreclosing lender which did not participate in the dayto-day operations or waste disposal activities of the property would
not lose the protection of the secured lender exemption. The exemption applied so long as the lender's participation was no more exten-,
sive than merely monitoring the borrower's financial affairs, even if
the lender held title to the property for a short time. Although the
court did enumerate specific activities that would preclude a finding
that the lender was merely protecting its security interest,244 the difficulty inherent in determining the permitted level of lender participation and monitoring ought to be of great concern to any lender.
In fact, in United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.,2 45 the Eleventh

Circuit interpreted lender liability much more broadly than did the
court in Mirabile.246 Fleet Factors Corp. became a lender when it
advanced operating funds to Swainsboro Print Works against the assignment of Swainsboro's accounts receivable.2 47 As collateral for the
advances, Fleet Factors also obtained a security interest in Swainsboro's textile facility. After Swainsboro filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11, Fleet advanced no more funds but continued
to collect on the accounts receivable already assigned to it. Later,
Fleet foreclosed on its security interest.2 48 The EPA inspected the
facility and found 700 fifty-five gallon drums containing hazardous
substances and asbestos 'on249
the property. Fleet subsequently incurred
$400,000 in cleanup costs.
Although the court in Fleet Factorsbelieved that it had settled on
a middle ground between the position of the government and the
summary judgment was heard. Id.
241. Id.
242. See, e.g., Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg., 732 F. Supp. "556 (W.D.
Pa. 1989). In Guidice, the mortgagee bank held title for eight months. The court held
that the security interest exemption did not apply during the time. "When a lender is the
successful purchaser at a foreclosure sale, the lender should be liable [under CERCLA]
to the same extent as any other bidder at the sale would have been." Id. at 563.
243. 15 Envt'l. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
244. Id. Unpermitted activities included supervising the operations of the facility
or insisting on manufacturing changes or reassignment of personnel. Id.
245. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
246. Id. at 1558.
247. Id. at 1552.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1553.

lender,250 the court's position was in fact extreme. The court rejected
as too permissive the Mirabile rule that "[m]ere financial ability to
control waste disposal practices ... [is not] sufficient for the imposition of liability. 2' 51 Instead, the court adopted an expansive capacity
to control test by which a "secured creditor will be liable if its involvement with the management of the facility is sufficiently broad
to support the inference that it could affect hazardous waste disposal
decisions if it so chose. '2 52 However, the court indicated that a
lender could, without subjecting itself to liability, monitor any aspect
of a debtor's business and become involved in occasional and discrete
20 3
financial decisions relating to the protection of its security interest.
Thus, in Fleet Factors, the lender was not held liable when it advanced funds to Swainsboro against the assignment of Swainsboro's
accounts receivable, paid and arranged for security deposits for utility service, and informed the debtor that it would ndt advance any
more money.2 54 However, Fleet Factors the lender did become liable
when it later required the debtor:
to seek its approval before shipping its goods to customers, established the
price for excess inventory, dictated when and to whom the finished goods
should be shipped, determined when employees should be laid off, supervised the activity of the office administrator at the site, received and
processed employment and tax forms, controlled access to the facilities, and
contracted ...

to dispose of the fixtures and equipment. 285

A disturbing aspect of the decisions in Fleet Factors and Mirabile
is the difficulty in determining what participation is permitted. In
neither case did the involvement giving rise to liability have an actual relationship to the handling or disposal of hazardous waste. As a
practical matter, any lender making a significant loan will attain
some oversight of the borrower's business and may thereby gain "capacity to influence the [borrower's] treatment of hazardous waste,"
which could subject it to Fleet Factors liability. None of the decisions provides much comfort for lenders worried about hazardous
waste liabilities.256

250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. at 1558.
Id. at 1556 (quoting Mirabile, 15 Envt'l. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20992).
Id. at 1558.
Id.

254.

Id. at 1559.

255. Id.
256. See also In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668, 673 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990)
(holding that there must be some actual management of a plant before a secured creditor
can be liable, but declining to rule otherwise on control).
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F.

Special Problems "

1. Underground Storage Tanks

In July, 1991, the EPA revised technical rules governing most underground petroleum storage tanks.25 7 These rules require that all
existing tanks be replaced or upgraded to meet federal restrictions,
including corrosion protection and spill and overflow protection. 25 ' In
addition, tank owners and operators need to employ some method of
detecting releases.259
The EPA has also adopted rules requiring tank owners and operators to demonstrate some form of "financial responsibility."26 Most
facilities will be required to purchase insurance, unless they can selfinsure 261 in the amount of $500,000 or more per incident. 62
These rules are of concern to any investor who is considering
starting or purchasing either a business which uses underground
storage tanks or real estate on which such tanks are located. The
cost of doing business may be significantly increased by these monitoring and financial responsibility requirements.
2. Asbestos

The presence of asbestos is a significant obstacle to the sale, leasing, and operation of buildings. 263 Asbestos was routinely used in
construction from the 1880s until the 1970s. The physical and chemical characteristics of asbestos fibers pose a significant health risk
when in the air.264 Asbestos-containing material (ACM) is found in
three forms: sprayed or troweled on ceilings and walls; in insulation
around hot or cold pipes, ducts, and boilers; and in other products
such as ceiling tiles and floorboards. However, as long as the ACM
is in good condition, not "friable"265 and not disturbed, it probably
does not pose a health risk.
OSHA contains no requirement that commercial buildings be
257. EPA Solid Waste, 40 C.F.R. § 280.10(b)(G) (1991) (excepting on-site heating oil tanks).
258. Id. § 280.21.
259. Id. § 280.40. The release detection compliance is phased in over five years. Id.
260. Id. §§ 280.90, 280.93.
261. Id. § 280.95.
262. Id. § 280.93.
263. N.Y. Times, Apr. 28 1988, at 25.
264. EPA, Guidancefor ControllingAsbestos-Containing Materials in Buildings
§ 1-2 (1985).
265. "Friable" asbestos is that which can be crumbled, pulverized, or reduced to
powder by hand pressure. Id. § 1.

tested for ACM. However, building owners should not ignore known
risks. An owner or lessor of a building with friable asbestos can be in
breach of the common law duty to warn.2 6
Finally, even if the ACM is currently not a threat, a potential
investor must consider the effect of ACM regulations on the cost of
any planned demolition or renovation. 61 7 Any demolition of a building containing ACM requires advance notice to the EPA. Moreover,
anyone doing demolition or renovation must both apply wet removal
techniques and avoid any visible dust emissions during the removal,
transport, and disposal of ACM. 68
3. State and Federal Disclosure Requirements
Under CERCLA, any person in charge of a facility is required to
notify the National Response Center as soon as he or she has knowledge of an unauthorized release of a hazardous substance in an
amount greater than or equal to the reportable quantity for that
substance.269 Reportable quantities are determined by EPA for many
hazardous substances.
CERCLA also contains provisions which
require the formation of emergency planning systems at facilities
within each state for the event of unauthorized releases of hazardous
substances. 11
States may also have their own notification requirements. For example, the California Water Code requires any person who discharges certain hazardous substances into "waters of the state"2' 2 to
notify the Office of Emergency Services or appropriate Regional
Water Quality Control Board as soon as the person has knowledge of
the discharge or possible discharge, so long as notification is possible
and will not impede remediation efforts.21 3 California statutes also
require disclosure of information about asbestos in buildings.2 4 Any
owner, lessee, sublessee, or agent of an owner of a public or commercial building built prior to 1979 must notify his or her employees,
lessees, and co-owners of every known location of asbestos-containing
266. See infra text accompanying notes 36-37.
267. 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.141-796.3320 (1991).
268. Id. § 61.145.
269. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (1986).
270. 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (1991). A reportable quantity is set between one pound
and five thousand pounds, depending on the toxicity of the substance. The reportable
quantity is measured over a twenty-four hour period. Id.
271. Id. § 300.200.
272. CAL. WATER CODE § 13050(e) (1991) defines "Waters of the state" to mean
"any water, surface or underground, including saline waters, within the boundaries of the
state."
273. Id. § 13271.
274. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25915-25919.5 (West 1991 & Supp.
1992).
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construction material. 5 The notification standard is extremely low
and may be below detection levels. Oddly, the requirement does not
apply only to friable ACM and it is triggered by knowledge. However, the statute imposes no requirement of an asbestos survey.
Other states have requirements that contamination or disposal
uses be disclosed to buyers prior to transfer. 276 As a practical matter,
these laws assure that contamination becomes part of the negotiation
process of any acquisition or investment. Moreover, they encourage
the remediation of that contamination.
OSHA contains Hazard Communication Standards applicable to
manufacturing employees.177 Each manufacturing employer is required to establish a written comprehensive hazard communication
program for its employees which explains health effects of workplace
chemicals and employee training. 27 a The hazard determination for
each chemical is placed on a "material safety data sheet," 279 which
must also be provided to all other manufacturing employers to which
the chemical is provided.280
4. Restrictions on Transfer of ContaminatedProperties

Investors should consider whether the state in which they propose
to invest may impose restrictions on transfer of contaminated properties. An example of such a restriction is New Jersey's Environmental
Cleanup Responsibility Act (ECRA) .21 Under ECRA, any transfer
of ownership of industrial land must be approved by the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection. 82 Transfer of ownership
which is subject to such approval includes statutory mergers, certain
leases, and certain sales of assets. Prior to any transfer, an owner
must submit either a "negative declaration,"28 3 assuring that there is
no need for cleanup of hazardous substances at the site, or a
275. Id. §§ 25915, 25915.2(a), 25915.5(a). Asbestos-containing construction material is that "which contains more than one percent asbestos by weight." Id. § 25919.
276. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25359.7 (West 1991 & Supp. 1992); MINN.
STAT. § 115B.16 (1990); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6018.405 (1989); W. VA. CODE §
20-5E-20 (1991).
277. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1990).

278. Id. § 1910.1200(e).
279. Id. § 1910.1200(g).
280. Id. § 1910.1000.
281. N.J. REV. STAT. § 13:1K-6 (1991).
282. Id. § 13:IK-8(g).
283. Id. (defining negative declaration as a "written declaration ... that there has
been no discharge of hazardous substances of wastes on the site, or that such discharge
has been cleaned up.")

remediation plan and financial assurance that such plan can and will
be completed.284 Penalties for failure to comply
include damages and
289
civil penalties of up to $25,000 per day.
5.

Lien Laws

CERCLA imposes a lien on property owned by the responsible
party and subject to or affected by cleanup actions.28 It can be imposed for the amount of all costs and damages for which the party is
liable to the United States.287 The lien arises at the later of the time
the EPA first incurs cleanup costs or the time the responsible party
is first notified in writing of potential liability.288 Generally, however,
the lien is subject to state law priority rules.289 Many states have
similar lien laws. 90
III. RECOMMENDATIONS TO POTENTIAL INVESTORS
The cost of complying with environmental regulation in the
United States is a significant consideration for potential foreign investors. While the costs imposed on any particular business cannot
be identified without a specific investigation of the business and applicable regulations, there are two general ways whereby investors
can minimize these costs. First, the investor can conduct a pre-investment investigation of the target business or real estate to identify
known environmental risks and expected costs. Second, the investor
can, through careful contract negotiation and drafting, apportion unknown risks so as to reduce future liability for environmental liability and risks.
A.

Pre-Investment Investigation

With rare exceptions, it is advisable to investigate the environmental condition of any target business or real estate in which the party
may wish to invest. Particularly under CERCLA's scheme of strict,
joint and several, and retroactive liability,291 the cost of remedying
environmental contamination can dwarf the value of a business or
real estate acquisition. An environmental assessment, or environmental "audit," should help inform the investor of the true value of the
284.
285.
286.
287.

Id.
Id. §§ 13:1K-13(a)-(c).
42 U.S.C. § 9607(1)(1) (1990).
Id.

288. Id. § 9607(l)(2).

289. Id. § 9607(l)(3).
290. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-452a (West 1988 & Supp. 1991);
MAss. GEN L. ch. 21E, § 13 (West Supp. 1991); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 147-B: 10-b
(1990); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-3a § 15 13(g)(7)(F) (West Supp. 1992).
291. See supra notes 109-30 and accompanying text.
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contemplated acquisition. It should identify any existing claims and
contamination, and it should assess the risk of future liability that
might arise. The information provided by the audit is the best protection against unanticipated environmental liability.
A pre-acquisition environmental investigation can identify two
potential types of problems. First, in any purchase of real estate, including purchases of businesses owning real estate, a competent assessment will identify existing environmental problems associated
with the land. An experienced environmental consultant should review applicable public records for evidence of past environmental
problems. The consultant should also inspect the site and may take
samples of soil and groundwater to determine whether any contamination is actually present. If the real estate is owned by an operating
business, the consultant should discuss the site with past or present
employees, in particular to determine 'whether there has been any
on-site waste disposal. Finally, the consultant should determine
whether the real estate to be purchased is threatened by pollutants
on adjoining properties; under CERCLA, a current property owner
can be liable for the cleanup costs associated with pollution of his or
her property, even if the pollution is caused by contamination from
another site.292
Knowing whether real estate to be acquired is contaminated confers two primary benefits on an investor. First, as a practical matter,
it gives a potential investor certainty in gauging the value of the contemplated investment. If the assessment determines that the property
is not contaminated, the buyer is assured that the investment will not
be overwhelmed by cleanup costs. If there is contamination, the
buyer can demand that the risks and expected costs of the contamination be addressed in negotiation of the transaction. Second, a
complete due diligence investigation provides a legal benefit. If the
property is clean, the results of the investigation are evidence that at
the time the investor acquired the property, he did not know and had
"no reason to know," after all appropriate inquiry consistent with
good commercial practices, that any hazardous substance was disposed of on, in, or at the property. These showings are required to
establish the "innocent owner" defense to liability under
CERCLA.9 3
The second line of inquiry in an environmental assessment, with
respect to acquisition of an ongoing business, is the adequacy of
292.
293.

See supra note 136-38 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 231-35 and accompanying text.

compliance with operative environmental laws and regulations. An
assessment should consider whether all permits and licenses required
to carry on the activities of the business have been obtained and are
current. It should identify whether the business has received notice
of any alleged violations of environmental laws from any government
or private claimant. The consultant should review public and company records to gauge past regulatory compliance and safety practices. The consultant should also inspect the business premises and
interview current and former employees to determine whether there
are past or present problems.
The primary benefit of inquiring into the environmental conduct of
an ongoing business is to determine whether the business has incurred, is incurring, or is likely to incur significant environmental
compliance costs. For instance, if the consultant determines that air
or water discharge requirements are not being met, it may estimate
what the cost consequences of remedying the noncompliance, voluntarily or involuntarily, will be. In addition, the business' past conduct
itself may affect costs of'compliance in the future. As a practical
matter, regulatory agencies may look more charitably upon an infrequent miscue of a generally law-abiding company than another
transgression in a history of corporate noncompliance.
A business' noncompliance with environmental operational rules
will generally not threaten the catastrophic liability posed by CERCLA real estate cleanups. There is one major exception to this general rule, however. An environmental audit gauging compliance
should pay attention to the method and location of past and present
waste disposal; as generator of the waste, and the party who arranged for its disposal, the business may be strictly liable for all or a
portion of the cleanup of hazardous substance releases at the business' waste disposal sites, if hazardous substances are released
there.294 Therefore, an audit should determine as accurately as possible whether the business has disposed of its waste in full compliance
with the law and at safe, preferably RCRA-permitted, disposal sites.
RCRA-permitted disposal sites are subject to strict safety requirements, and their operators must provide financial assurance that
proper closure of the site will be effected.29 5
B. Allocation of Risks Among Contracting Parties
The discovery of environmental problems will give the parties the
opportunity to negotiate the allocation of the cost of any remedy.
294. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 78-95 and accompanying text.
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Most often, known risks can be used to adjust the price of the transactions. The parties can also agree who will conduct or fund the required remedies.
Contract negotiations are especially important in allocating unknown risks. In rare cases, the parties will negotiate that the property or business to be purchased will be taken "as is," allocating all
risks to the purchaser. More frequently, the parties will negotiate an
agreement in which the seller will bear some of the risk.
Negotiations over risk allocation are typically based on the notion
that it is fair for an investor to be defended or indemnified by a
seller for environmental liabilities which the investor had no role in
creating. Most often the agreement will incorportate a provision by
which the seller agrees to indemnify, or defend, or both indemnify
and defend the buyer against environmental liabilities the kind or
magnitude of which are unknown at the time of contracting. A contractual duty to indemnify can be triggered by a number of events,
including the receipt by the buyer of third party or governmental
claims for cleanup costs, the future discovery of contaminants from
the past business of the seller, or the breach of representations or
warranties made by the seller concerning the condition or compliance of the business.
Sellers are typically unwilling to indemnify buyers against every
possible future environmental liability. Therefore, it is common for
the parties to allocate unknown risks based on the truth of sellers'
representations and warranties. As part of a purchase and sale
agreement, the seller may make a series of representations of fact
about the asset or business being conveyed, including its environmental condition. If any representation proves to be false, the agreement
usually confers a right of indemnity on the buyer to recover the costs
or damages associated with the incorrect representation. A seller
may warrant to a condition of which he or she is unsure as a way of
assuming the risk that it may be false.
When negotiating environmental representations and warranties,
an investor should seek disclosure of any pending claims against the
business or property being acquired. The buyer should seek a representation that a business being acquired is in compliance with applicable laws and permits and that there are no leaking underground
storage tanks, friable asbestos, or PCBs on the property. The investor should also seek assurance that any hazardous waste generated
by the business has been properly disposed of lawfully and at a facility where it is unlikely to generate CERCLA liability. In particular,

the buyer should seek assurance that there has been no intentional
waste disposal on-site.
Since the seller may have to pay money in the event a representation is false, sellers often seek to limit representations and warranties
to the best of their knowledge. For example, the seller may offer to
warrant only that he or she does not know of any improper disposal
of waste. This may be appropriate for the sale of raw land or a longstanding company with which the warranting party has little experience. However, the investor should resist knowledge limitations
because it is more difficult to gauge subjective knowledge than objective fact. Such limitations may be particularly unacceptable when
the warranting party is the only reasonable source of the
information.
A seller may also attempt to restrict representations according to
materiality, so that every minor noncompliance is not an occasion to
refund money to the buyer. For example, the seller may represent
and warrant that the company is in "material compliance" with applicable environmental laws. However, the concept of materiality is
not easily defined in practice. A far more practical way to address
the concept of materiality is to negotiate a a deductible figure, called
a "skip," "basket" or "bucket," before which no recovery is allowed.
For example, if a sale contract provides for a $500,000 bucket, no
recovery would be allowed for the first $500,000 in environmental
claims or damages suffered by the buyer.
Finally, a seller may seek caps, in time and/or money, on its exposure for future liability. The parties may agree to limit the length of
time after an acquisition in which a claim can be brought by providing an expiration date for representations and warranties. The
buyer's ability to recover for breaches of the seller's promises lasts
only as long as the representations and warranties survive. Parties
also frequently agree to a limit on the total dollar amount of the
seller's remaining environmental liability.
Even if the investor secures the protection of indemnification
based on adequate representations and warranties, he or she should
be aware that an indemnification is only as good as the indemnitor's
pocket is deep. A buyer who is not dealing with a known deep-pocket
seller should closely examine financial statements of the indemnitor.
If the financial information does not provide assurance that the
indemnitor's promise to pay is reliable, the investor may seek other
or additional assurances that the seller can perform. One option is to
demand that part of the purchase price or investment be held for
some period of time in escrow in order to fund future problems.
However, escrows are extremely troublesome to negotiate because it
is difficult for parties to agree on the length of time the escrow
should last and the circumstances under which deductions can be
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made. Therefore, significant escrows are almost never feasible, except in rare instances of a discrete environmental problem which can
be remedied in a short period of time, where the end point of the
remedy can be easily identified.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The environmental laws that may affect a decision to invest in the
United States are numerous and perplexing. These laws impose two
types of costs. Laws such as the Clean Air Act or the Clean Water
Act impose costs of compliance which may significantly increase the
cost of operating a business. Common law claims and CERCLA are
the source of more sudden shocks to investors, who may be
ambushed with strict liability for the cost of expensive cleanups. Accordingly, it is vital that an investor take whatever steps are available to identify and guard against environmental liability through
pre-investment and contractual risk allocation.

